When the name Floxydy first appeared online, it looked like an ordinary cosmetics store. In Parts I and II, we revealed how that facade was used to channel money into online casinos linked to Vavada. Now the investigation moves further-to the infrastructure that enabled those payments: Paywrx and its technical backbone, NetworxPay.

Two faces of the same system:

The public website paywrx.com presents a polished fintech image-clean design, marketing language about “global solutions,” and claims of compliance and security. Yet the real operations take place elsewhere: inside backoffice.networxpay.com, a hidden merchant portal used for processing and settlements. This dual-brand architecture-a shiny public front with a concealed operational backend-is a hallmark of the high-risk acquiring world.
One side sells “compliance”; the other quietly handles transactions regulators would rather not see.

The cosmetic facade that smells of gambling:

Customer card statements showed charges from FLOXYBEATY (MCC 5977-Cosmetics Stores). Behind that label, however, there were no lipsticks or perfumes-only gambling deposits. Transaction traces indicate that funds flowed through Paywrx / NetworxPay, ending up in offshore casino ecosystems. By mis-coding transactions under MCC 5977, gambling payments appeared to banks, Visa, and Mastercard as harmless retail purchases.
It’s a textbook case of transaction laundering-concealing the true purpose of a payment under a legitimate merchant category.

Aleksejs Telepna-the man between two worlds:

One recurring name in this ecosystem is Aleksejs Telepna, a fintech professional whose LinkedIn profile lists expertise in processing, acquiring, and merchant operations-the exact areas responsible for integrating merchants and managing high-risk transactions.

Although his public résumé does not mention Paywrx or NetworxPay, Telepnevs appears in the crypto-industry outlet Forklog, in the article “How to Launch a Crypto Exchange from Scratch According to EQWALI.”
There, he describes onboarding and infrastructure models identical to those used by Paywrx: card processing intertwined with crypto on-ramps.

The overlap is hard to ignore.
EQWALI, Paywrx, and NetworxPay operate on the same borderland between traditional acquiring and digital-asset processing. Telepna-officially an independent fintech consultant-appears to be one of the architects connecting these two worlds: banking and crypto, front and shadow.

Russian interface and ruble footprints:

Perhaps the most striking clue lies inside backoffice.networxpay.com, which features a full Russian-language interface.
Menus, forms, and error messages can all be displayed in Russian-a rare choice for any Western-focused fintech platform.
Such localization makes sense only if the system serves active Russian-speaking users or administrators. It’s not a translation convenience; it’s an operational fingerprint.

A second clue emerges in ohmyswift.io, where the SWIFT code PYCNCA82 refers to a Canadian financial institution handling ruble exchange operations.
The presence of ruble-related data linked to this ecosystem suggests that Paywrx / NetworxPay infrastructure maintains compatibility with ruble-denominated flows-despite post-2022 sanctions.
In practice, that means a payment network able to straddle sanctioned and non-sanctioned corridors-a serious red flag under AML and KYC standards.

A network built from mirrors:

Every trace points to one conclusion: Paywrx and NetworxPay are not separate entities but two layers of a single system.
Domain metadata, identical login frameworks, and overlapping personnel confirm that both brands share the same core infrastructure. Telepna appearance in industry discussions about Paywrx-like technology-without naming it explicitly- mirrors the strategy of many Hydra-style networks: front-facing names change, but the architecture and the people behind it stay the same. It’s a deliberately modular structure: one team handles the glossy interface, another runs the backend, and a third routes crypto or high-risk funds in the background.

From cosmetics to crypto:

Paywrx markets itself as a bridge between traditional finance and blockchain. In practice, that bridge serves as a channel for transactional obfuscation-masking the origin and destination of funds.

The Floxydy pathway is simple:

1. A cosmetic storefront provides a legitimate façade.

2. Payments are processed by a “global, compliant” gateway.

3. Funds settle in an offshore gambling or crypto structure.

Each layer distances the payer from the final beneficiary and each layer makes recovery nearly impossible.

Compliance only on paper:

Paywrx’s public materials overflow with words like AML, KYC, and transparency.
Yet the evidence tells a different story:
no genuine source-of-funds checks, no disclosure of merchant ownership, no corrective action after clear abuse.
The system keeps running-new domains, new brands, the same codebase.

Hydra in a fintech suit:

Paywrx exemplifies the multi-headed structure that spinangacase has repeatedly documented-a Hydra of cloned processors operating under different names but built on the same backend. Yesterday it was Spinanga. Today it’s Paywrx. Tomorrow it will be another label. The names change; the logic and the infrastructure remain.

The bigger picture:

Floxydy is not an isolated case. It’s a glimpse into the global machinery of transaction-laundering networks disguised as fintech innovation. As long as processors like Paywrx combine card acquiring, crypto on-ramps, and high-risk merchant flows within one system, AML compliance will remain a marketing slogan-not a standard.

Paywrx can call itself a modern payment gateway, but in the context of Floxydy- and the footprint of Aleksejs Telepna-it stands as a symbol of the new era: an era where money-laundering no longer hides in basements, but in glossy dashboards and perfectly legal APIs.

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